Abstract. The aim of this paper is to present an algebraic approach to Jaś-kowski's paraconsistent logic D2. We present: a D2-discursive algebra, Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra for D2 and D2-matrices. The analysis is mainly based on the results obtained by Jerzy Kotas in the 70s.
Introduction
Discursive (or discussive) logic, D2, introduced by Jaśkowski is seen as one of the earliest examples of so-called paraconsistent logic (cf. Priest, Tanaka, & Weber 1996) . There are several definitions of paraconsistent logic. One of them is that paraconsistent logic is a logic which is not closed under the rule ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet, i.e. α, ∼ α / β. At first sight, this definition seems too general because it includes some logics which have little in common with paraconsistency, but it shows a tendency to regard paraconsistent logic as a logic of the negation connective. 1 Discursive logic shows the importance of a philosophical explanation for a formal approach to natural language. Usually in a discussion, people exchange ideas. They may use some vague predicates either purposefully or unintentionally. In thinking about sentences like 'He is rich', 'He is bald' or 'He is famous', one might be confused as to how to assign truth or falsity. This can lead to a seeming contradiction. Jaśkowski suggested that each sentence asserted by participants in a discourse should be interpreted as 'for a certain admissible meaning of the terms used'. If a sentence α 'is recorded in a discussive system, its intuitive sense ought to be interpreted so as if it were preceded by the symbol ♦, that is, the sense: it is possible that α' (Jaśkowski, 1999a, p. 43) , where ♦ is the connective of S5-possibility. 2 So Janusz Ciuciura as it is seen, Jaśkowski's logic is intended in part to deal with problems of vagueness.
On the other hand, 'it is known that the evolution of the empirical disciplines is marked by periods in which the theorists are unable to explain the results of experiments by a homogenous and consistent theory, but use different hypotheses, which are not always consistent with one another, to explain the various groups of phenomena. This applies, for instance, to physics in its present-day stage. Some hypotheses are even termed working hypotheses when they result in certain correct predictions, but have no chance to be accepted for good, since they fail in some other cases' (Jaśkowski, 1999a, p. 37) .
According to Jaśkowski, all these considerations raise an issue which should be formulated in terms of formal logic. It was his intention to 'find a system of the sentential calculus which: (1) when applied to the inconsistent systems would not always entail their overfilling, (2) would be rich enough to enable practical inference, (3) would have an intuitive justification. ' (Ibid., p. 38) Let var denote a non-empty denumerable set of all propositional variables {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} The set of (well-formed) formulas of the discursive logic is inductively defined in the following way: (i) if α ∈ var, then α is a formula of D2 (ii) if α is a formula of D2, then ∼ α is a formula of D2 (iii) if α and β are formulas of D2, then α • β are formulas of D2, where
, discursive conjunction, discursive implication and discursive equivalence, respectively. The language of the discursive logic will be denoted by L d .
Jaśkowski did not propose any axiomatization nor a direct semantics for D2, but defined his system through an interpretation of the language of S5 of Lewis; to be more precise:
where ♦ is the connective of S5-possibility and tr denotes a translation function of the language of D2 into the language of S5 of Lewis, tr :
By placing the symbol ♦ in front of every translated formula, we protect D2 from collapsing into deductive insufficiency. 'Can a discussive system be based on ordinary two-valued logic?' -Jaśkowski asked -'It can easily be seen that it is not so. Even such an elementary form of reasoning as the rule of modus ponens fails. If the implication is interpreted so as it is done in two-valued logic, then out of the two theses one of which is α → β, and thus states: it is possible that if α, then β, and the other is α, and thus states: it is possible that α, it does not follow that it is possible that β, so that the thesis β, does not follow intuitively, as the rule of modus ponens requires. ' (Ibid., p. 43.) One might be curious about why Jaśkowski did not define the discursive conjunction as (iv)
It is because their application would lead to some unwanted consequences, that is, the acceptance of the formula
) as a thesis of D2 (cf. Ciuciura, 2008, pp. 145-146) . So, metaphorically speaking, we do need diamonds and the two-step translation method.
Here is an example by way of illustration. Consider the formula
. By (v) and (iv) of the recurrent definition of the function tr, we receive:
Proposition 1.1 (Nasieniewski & Pietruszczak, 2012, p. 220) For any formulas
Proof. By induction on k, definition of tr, the rule (MP) for → and the fact that the formulas (1)
⌉ , where k ∈ N ∪ {0}, and
Jaśkowski's paraconsistent logic has been treated so far as a set of (discursive) formulas. Now we define a consequence relation (D2-consequence) on the set of all discursive formulas in the following way:
for any Γ ⊆ L d and every α ∈ L d ; where ⊢ S5 is an S5-consequence.
Janusz Ciuciura
We say that the formula α is a thesis of D2, ⊢ D2 α in symbols, if ∅ ⊢ D2 α.
It is noteworthy to mention at this point that there are several axiomatizations of D2 with discursive connectives taken as primitive symbols. Unfortunately, some of them are not complete with respect to the semantics discussed here. For instance, one can easily check that ⌈ α → d ∼∼ α ⌉ ∈ D2, but the formula is not provable in the axiomatic system that is presented in (Ciuciura, 2008) . 3 Observe that for any α ∈ L d , we have (cf. Nasieniewski & Pietruszczak, 2012, p. 222) :
A question arises: Is it possible to redefine D2 in such a way to eliminate the translation method and give a direct semantics for D2? We answer the question in the affirmative. 4
Definition 1.1
A D2-frame is a pair W, R , where W is a non-empty set of points and R is an equivalence relation on W . A D2-model is a triple W, R, v , where v is a mapping from propositional variables to sets of points, v : var −→ 2 W . The satisfaction relation |= m is inductively defined as follows:
For any formula α ∈ L d : α is valid in D2, |= α in symbols, iff for any D2-model W, R, v , ∀x ∈ W , ∃y ∈ W (xRy and y |= m α).
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof given in (Ciuciura, 2005, pp. 239-240) .
It follows from Proposition 1.2 that the translation procedure becomes rendered redundant. Moreover, D2 can be alternatively characterized by models where the accessibility relation is universal, that is, the accessibility relation includes every pair of points (or every point is accessible from any other). This results in some simplifications:
A D2-model is a pair W, v , where W is a non-empty set of points and v is a function that each pair consisting of a formula and a point assigns an element of {1, 0}, v :
In 1968, da Costa and Dubikajtis presented the first algebraic semantics for Jaśkowski's discursive logic. The algebraic approach was further developed by Kotas. The aim of the next sections is to present an algebraic approach to Jaśkowski's discursive logic.
D2-discursive algebra
In this section, we present an infinite matrix for D2. Before going into details, let us introduce an algebraic semantics for the system S5.
Definition 2.1
A Henle's algebra H = A, −, ∨, I is a Boolean algebra A = A, −, ∨, with an additional unary operation I (interior) over A such that
In addition to the operation I, we can define the closure operation C over A as follows:
Informally speaking, the operation C (resp. I) is an algebraic counterpart of the S5-possibility (resp. S5-necessity) connective.
Definition 2.2
An algebra A = A, −, ∨, ∧ d , → d , 0, 1 is called D2-discursive iff the following conditions hold: (1) the structure A = A, −, ∨, 0, 1 is a Boolean algebra for every elements a, b ∈ A:
Let K D2 denote a class of all discursive matrices of the form
Theorem 2.1 (cf. da Costa & Dubikajtis, 1968) For every formula α ∈ L d the following holds:
Proof. By definition of D2, translation function tr and Henle's algebra. A given binary relation ≈ on a set X is said to be an equivalence relation on the set iff it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive on X, i.e. for all a, b and c ∈ X:
The equivalence class of a under ≈, [a] for short, is defined in the usual way, viz.
[a] = {b ∈ X : a ≈ b}. Proposition 3.1 (Kotas, 1975a, p. 156) (1) A binary relation ≈ defined as
is an equivalence relation on the set of all formulas of D2. It follows from Proposition 3.1 that the equivalence relation ≈ is not a congruence on the set of all formulas of D2. Before solving the problem, let us define the set of all positive formulas of the discursive logic D2:
(ii) if α and and β are formulas of D2, then α • β are positive formulas of D2, where
Proposition 3.2
The formulas
Proof. Apply the direct semantics for D2 (or, alternatively, the translation method). As an example, we prove that
Consequently, there is no D2-model W, v such that for every
Proposition 3.3
D2 is closed under the rule:
Proof. Assume that (1)
Apply the definition of D2 and the recurrent definition of the function tr, to receive (3):
⌉ ∈ S5 by (T1), (3) and the rule of detachment for material implication. 7 Note that S5 is closed under the rule (R1): if φ ∧ ψ then φ, so we receive: (5) and the rule of detachment. Similarly, since (T3) (6) and the rule of detachment. (7) and the rule of detachment. Notice that (T5)
and S5 is closed under the rule of adjunction (AR): if φ and ψ then φ ∧ ψ. As a result, we have:
⌉ ∈ S5 by (AR), (8) and (T5). By the definition of (↔) and (9), we get: (10)
and the rule of detachment. Apply the definition of (↔), (R1) and (R1)': if φ ∧ ψ then ψ, to obtain: (12)
and the rule of detachment. Similarly, (15)
and the rule of detachment; (16)
and the rule of detachment. Now, we revert to (13) and obtain: (17)
⌉ ∈ S5, (13) and the rule of detachment. Since (T11)
⌉ ∈ S5 by (T11), (17) and the rule of detachment. Use (T9), (18) and the rule of detachment, to receive:
Apply the rule of adjunction (AR) to (16) and (19), to have: (20)
⌉ ∈ S5. Now apply the definitions of D2, the translation function tr and the definition of (↔ d ), to finally get:
Let L + d be a set of all positive formulas of D2. Obviously, the relation ≈ is a congruence of the algebra
Definition 3.2
A binary relation ≤ defined on a nonempty set X is a partial order on the set X if it is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive on X.
Let D2
+ denote the set of all positive (negation-free) formulas of D2.
Proposition 3.4
(1) The relation
+ and for any formula γ: γ ∈ [β], then β ≈ γ. But this means that
+ and, consequently, γ ∈ D2 + . Now for the reverse inclusion observe that if γ ∈ D2 + , then
Definition 3.3
A nonempty set X together with two binary operations ∩ (join) and ∪ (meet) on X is called a lattice if the following axiomatic identities hold for all elements a, b, c of X:
Theorem 3.1 (Kotas, 1975a, p. 156) (1) Algebra A + , ∪, ∩ d is a lattice;
(2) for every elements a, b, x ∈ A + :
Proof. By Definition 3.3, propositions 3.2-3.4 and the definitions of ∩ d ∪, .
Notice that A + , ∪, ∩ d , is a classical implicative lattice (cf. Kotas, 1975a, p. 156 ) and the set of D2 + coincides with the positive part of the classical propositional calculus. In this regard, we may read off the validity of any negation-free discursive formula directly from a classical true-value analysis.
Jaśkowski was aware of this fact. He formulated two theorems of connection linking D2 to the classical propositional calculus (cf. Ciuciura, 2008; Jaśkowski, 1949) :
Suppose that a formula α contains, besides variables, at most the connectives ∧, →, ↔ and ∨. If α is valid in the classical propositional calculus, then α d is valid in D2, where α d is obtained from α by replacing ∧, →, ↔,
Proof. See (Jaśkowski, 1999a, pp. 45-46) and (Jaśkowski, 1999a, pp. 57-58) .
Theorem 3.3
Let a formula α include, besides variables, at most the connectives ∧ d , → d , ↔ d and ∨. If α is valid in D2, then α cpc is valid in classical propositional calculus, where α cpc is obtained from α by replacing
Proof. See (Jaśkowski, 1999a, p. 49 ).
Lindenbaum−Tarski algebra for D2 and D2-matrices
As seen in the previous section, the standard approach fails to construct the Lindenbaum algebra for Jaśkowski's discursive logic. The equivalence relation ≈ is not a congruence on the set of all formulas of D2. This, however, can be resolved. It suffices to suppose that the connectives of ∼, ∨ and ∧ d are taken as primitives. Let L * d denote the resulting language. The connective of discursive implication is introduced through the definition:
To describe the relevant results, we need one more definition:
Definition 4.2 (Kotas, 1975a, p. 157 )
Definition 4.2 is of special interest because it shows that strict implication may be expressed in terms of negation, disjunction and discursive conjunction. It brings about the following:
The rule of strict detachment
is an admissible rule in D2.
Proof. Assume that (1) α ∈ D2 and (2) ⌈ α ⇒ β ⌉ ∈ D2, then, by Definition 4.2 and (2), we have:
Apply the definition of D2 and the recurrent definition of the function tr, to get:
Hence, by (T1), (5) and the rule of detachment for material implication, we receive: (6) ⌈
⌉ ∈ S5 by (T2), (6) and the rule of detachment. Again, since (T3)
⌉ ∈ S5 by (T3), (7) and the rule of detachment. Apply the rule of adjunction (AR) to (4) and (8), to receive:
(T4), (9) and the rule of detachment. But if ⌈ ♦β ⌉ ∈ S5, then β ∈ D2 by the definition of D2. The formulas
Proof. By Definition 4.2 and the direct semantics for D2. As an example, we show that
Suppose, for contradiction, that the formula 
Definition 4.3 (Kotas, 1975a, p. 158) For any formula α, β ∈ L *
Proposition 4.3 (ibid.)
(1) ≈ * is an equivalence relation on the set of all formulas of D2.
Proof. (1), (2), (3): By Definition 4.3 and propositions 4.1-4.2.
Proposition 4.4
Let ⊤ = p 1 ∨ ∼ p 1 , where p 1 ∈ var, and ⊥ = ∼ ⊤. The formulas
Before going further we introduce the following definition:
Definition 4.4
A skew lattice is an algebra A, ∪, ∩ of type (2, 2) , where both ∪ and ∩ are associative, idempotent binary operations on A which satisfy the absorption identities: 
Proof. (1), (2), (3) Proposition 4.5 (Kotas, 1975a, p. 159) For every elements a, b ∈ A * :
Theorem 4.2 (Kotas, 1975a, p. 159) A formula α is a thesis of D2 (see Section 1) iff the equality 1
Theorem 4.3 (ibid.)
∇ is a proper filter of the algebra A * , ∪, ∩ d , −, 1, 0 .
Proof. First, we have to show that ∇ is a filter of the algebra A * , ∪, ∩ d , −, 1, 0 , i.e. for every element a, b ∈ A * :
(1) a ∩ d b ∈ ∇ iff a ∈ ∇ and b ∈ ∇ (2) if a ∈ ∇ then a ∪ b ∈ ∇. 
Theorem 4.5
D2 is an infinitely valued system.
Proof. See (Kotas, 1975b) .
da Costa, Kotas and Dubukajtis' discursive logic
In 1977, da Costa and Dubikajtis presented an axiomatization of D2 (cf. da Costa & Dubikajtis, 1977) . However, as it was shown in (Ciuciura, 2008) and (Ciuciura, 2005) , they axiomatized a system that differed from Jaśkowski's discursive logic. Their axiomatics included, among others, a connective intended to be Jaśkowski's discursive conjunction, but, in fact, it did not correspond to any of Jaśkowski's connectives, viz. (iv) ⋆ tr ⋆ (α∧
⋆ denote da Costa and Dubikajtis' system of discursive logic and L ⋆ d stand for a language of the system.
Definition 5.1
An algebra A ⋆ = A, −, ∨, ∧
